This paper uses a product-level gravity approach to estimate the effect of ASEAN's product-specific rules of origin (ROOs) on regional trade, using original data on rules applicable at the six-digit level of the harmonized system. We find that the average tariff ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of ASEAN's ROOs is 3.40 percent across all instruments and sectors. The trade-weighted average is 2.09 percent. This moderate estimate is in line with the existing literature. We also find fairly high AVEs for some sectors, however, including leather, textile and apparel, footwear, and automobiles. Additionally, we find that some rules appear more restrictive than others; in this regard, the textile rule seems to stand out as a relatively more trade-inhibiting rule than others.
Introduction
Two major trends characterize the world trading system today. On one hand, it is increasingly governed by preferential trade agreements (PTAs), of which there are close to 300 today, and a new one almost every month (Calvo-Pardo, Freund, and Ornelas 2009) . On the other hand, international trade has increasingly involved "trade in tasks" within global value chains (GVCs). Rule of origin (ROOs) stand in the middle of these two major trends and have the potential to make them incompatible, because they constrain the sourcing choices of multinational firms along regional patterns dictated by existing PTAs, whereas GVC optimization may call for different choices. One of the challenges of "multilateralizing regionalism"-an expression coined by Baldwin (2006) -is to prevent ROOs from working at cross-purposes with the rise of GVCs.
The issues are salient in East Asia and the Pacific, where regionalism is a relatively recent phenomenon (see Kimura 2010) but is spreading rapidly. Since the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, the drive for regional trade liberalization has accelerated, in particular after the Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s. Although the tariffelimination schedule was more progressive in ASEAN than for instance in NAFTA, it proceeded largely according to schedule, and tariff elimination between the six founding members 1 was largely completed by 2010, and covered over 90 percent of intra-bloc trade (Calvo-Pardo, Freund, and Ornelas 2009) . By January 2010, ASEAN had five ASEAN+1 FTAs with its main trading partners: Australia and New Zealand, China, Japan, Korea, and India. ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 initiatives have gained momentum with their upgrading to so-called track-1 level (government-to-government). 2 Given that MFN tariffs are still substantial in at least some of the member countries, tariff preference margins can make a difference.
"Fragmentation trade" has grown faster than total world trade in manufacturing, and the degree of dependence of East Asia on this new form of international specialization is proportionately larger than that of North America and Europe (Athukorala 2005) . Compared with other regional blocs, in particular in the West, East Asian and TransPacific regionalism have several distinguishing features. NAFTA and the EU partnership agreements were arguably of a hegemonic nature; for instance, the EU agreements with some of its Mediterranean partners mandate the harmonization of non-tariff measures on EU standards; similarly, ROOs in both NAFTA and the EU's Pan-Euro system have been largely dictated by the Northern partner (the United States and EU, respectively). They were also characterized by strong hub-and-spoke trade structures. By contrast, East Asian/Pacific regionalism brings together a multipolar region with several economic and political heavyweights, including Japan, China, and the United States, and a number of mid-size but politically sophisticated partners like Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Second, and perhaps most importantly, a large chunk of the region's trade is in manufactured products (e.g., electronics) characterized by economies of scale and the prevalence of large firms organized in cross-border value chains. Together, these features imply that the political economy of ROOs is likely to be quite different from that in NAFTA or EU partnerships.
A voluminous literature (for recent surveys, see Cadot et al. 2006a Cadot et al. , 2006b Medalla and Balboa 2009; or Kelleher 2012 and references therein) has looked into the drivers and effects of ROO in PTAs. In principle, their objective is to prevent trade deflection in the absence of external-tariff harmonization. Essentially, the political-economic mechanism behind restrictive ROOs in north-south agreements could be double. First, costly ROOs are a way of "denying preferences" granted to Southern producers and hence of relieving the competitive pressures generated within the bloc by tariff phase-outs. Second, when a northern country has a comparative advantage in upstream, capital-intensive sectorslike weaving in the textile & apparel sector, or the making of engines in the automobile sector-ROOs create a captive market for those intermediates in the southern partner where, under bilateral cumulation, assemblers have no choice but to source those intermediates from the northern (hegemonic) country.
Given the different patterns of economic and political fundamentals in the East Asia and the Pacific region, these political-economy drivers are likely to be weaker, although not necessarily absent. First, as noted by Kimura (2010) , neither Japan nor China, the region's heavyweights, have played as engines of regional integration, as the United States and EU did in their respective spheres of influence. Japan, in particular, has not sought to create a Japan-centered hub-and-spoke regional trade bloc. In part this is because part of the motivation for the United States and EU trade preferences with Southern partners-Mexico for the United States, Central Europe and the Mediterranean countries for the EU-was to create "mini-worlds" where the gains from specialization could be reaped while maintaining some degree of trade protection vis-à-vis efficient Asian countries, in particular in the textile and apparel sector where high most favored nation (MFN) tariffs made preferential liberalization highly relevant. 3 This motivation was much weaker, although not necessarily absent in at least some sectors, for Japan.
Second, although there is no systematic data on firm-level control over GVCs, 4 many of the GVCs in the electronics sector are dominated by large firms that internalize all complementarities along it. Those firms have no interest in forcing inefficient sourcing at any stage of processing. Even in the absence of vertical integration, subcontracting relationships are rarely arms-length, and economies of scale are so strong that many components are produced in a handful of establishments serving the entire world market. In such conditions, throwing in ROOs to hurt the competitiveness of some of the downstream assemblers to favor others makes little sense.
The use of AFTA and ASEAN+1 FTAs was still relatively low in ASEAN, however. A number of studies assert that the utilization rate of FTA was about 20 percent between 2006 and 2008 across six ASEAN countries-namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (Hayakawa et al. 2013 )-and increased to about 25 percent in 2011 (Hayakawa et al. 2013 , based on the JETRO Survey on Japanese affiliated firms). The latest survey-based analysis on 630 manufacturing firms across nine ASEAN countries (ASEAN countries, except Brunei Darussalam) assert that, on average, the use of AFTA or ASEAN+1 FTAs was 21 percent for exports and 18 percent for imports (Ing et al. 2015) . 5 Using the official certificate of origin (COO) and trade customs data, it is claimed that while the number of COOs significantly increased, their value remained only one-third of total trade in July 2013 (Khopaiboon and Jongwanich 2015).
Thus, there is prima facie reason to believe that ROOs in the Asia-Pacific region are less susceptible to be distorted by special-interest capture than their equivalents in NAFTA or Pan-Euro; they could still be trade-restricting because they are unnecessarily complex or cumbersome to satisfy. This is essentially an empirical question that should be settled by statistical analysis. This is what we set out to do in this paper, using the variation in trade flows across country pairs and products as the identification mechanism to detect any trade-inhibiting effect of ROOs. Our exploration is guided by the gravity equation, the workhorse of much empirical work in international trade. We run a disaggregated gravity equation at the product (HS6) level, controlling for the gravity's usual determinants as well as tariffs and a vector of dummies marking the presence of each type of productspecific ROO.
Section 2 reviews ASEAN's ROOs. Section 3 describes a theoretical framework, an estimation strategy, the data, and our data sources. Section 4 presents empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. Second are regime-wide rules-essentially, cumulation rules, the others being of secondary importance-these specify the treatment of intermediates imported from other countries in the same bloc or countries with special status in terms of cumulation. Mechanically, full cumulation is less stringent than diagonal cumulation. In practice, however, proving compliance with full-cumulation rules implies complete traceability of the production process and sourcing of intermediates. This is a heavy burden for many companies both in terms of paperwork and-more importantly-in terms of disclosure of sensitive price and supplier information. So some firms prefer not to use full cumulation despite its advantages on paper.
Stylized facts
The estimations reveal the rule of thumb of cost of compliance of ROOs are between 3 percent and 5 percent. First, using the revealed-preference approach, Herin (1986) estimates the compliance costs of EU ROOs for Central European countries at 5 percent; Cadot, Estevadeordal, and Suwa-Eisenmann (2005) find 2 percent for NAFTA. Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2007) note that the AFTA utilization rate was on average only 5 percent and attributed this low uptake to ROOs and other documentation requirements. They also find threshold effects in tariff-preference margins (only at high levels did they affect trade), again suggestive of compliance costs offsetting the benefit of tariff reductions. Brenton and Manchin (2003) and others also assert similarly low utilization rates for EU preferences, but the issue was muddled in the case of the EU by the large number of overlapping schemes that depressed uptake for every one taken in isolation, whereas EU preferences, as a whole, had high combined uptake (see Candau and Jean 2005) .
Second, using econometric approaches instead, Francois, Hoekman, and Manchin (2006) estimate compliance costs at 4 percent and Cadot et al. (2006a) estimate them at 6.5 percent. Beyond averages, Cadot et al. (2006a) , Estevadeordal (2000) , and Estevadeordal and Suominen (2008) find that ROO restrictiveness was typically higher in sectors also characterized by tariff peaks. Portugal-Perez (2009) decomposed NAFTA's ROOs into a component reflecting traditional trade-deflection concerns (proxied by the tariff differential between the United States and Mexico) and political-economy interference, and found that the latter raised the compliance costs of ROOs on average by 4.5 percentage points. Most recently, Kelleher (2013) modifies Harris' (2007) restrictiveness index to take cumulation rules into account. She proxied the facilitation effect of cumulation rules by the economic size of the cumulation zone (the share of the zone's combined GDPs in world GDP), and found a significant and sizable trade-inhibiting effect associated with higher values of her modified restrictiveness index, in particular in the textile and apparel sector.
ASEAN's tariffs and ROOs 2.2.1. MFN and preferential tariffs
ROOs can be binding only when tariff-preference margins are substantial, which in turn requires the presence of sufficiently large MFN tariffs. ASEAN has made rapid progress in the phasing out of preferential tariffs except for Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam (see Figure 1) , so tariff-preference margins are essentially MFN rates. 7 These rates are not negligible, implying that tariff-preference margins are substantial and confer benefits to exporters justifying the choice of the preferential regime even in the presence of compliance costs.
Decomposing MFN tariffs by sector, Table 1 shows, on the basis of the limited availability of tariffs from the multilateral TRAINS database, that ASEAN member states have substantial MFN tariffs, in particular on sensitive sectors such as food and beverages (Section 4), textiles and apparel (Section 11), footwear (Section 12), and vehicles (Section 17). These are all sensitive sectors in terms of employment, but they are also sectors where cross-border GVCs are most prevalent, and hence where ROOs can substantially constrain firms. Going down one level of disaggregation, the picture at the level of HS chapters (not shown for brevity) is largely the same. Except for Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, which have very low MFN tariffs, the number of zero-rated chapters is relatively low. Out Moreover, in many cases, the importer can choose which rule to use among two-namely, RVC or CTC. Behind the relatively simple logical structure, however, there is substantial variation at the product level. The most prevalent combination of instruments at the product level is a choice between a regional value content at 40 percent and a change of tariff heading (HS4). This concerns 11,764 product lines in all of ASEAN's trade (internal and bilateral with preferential partners), or 37.74 percent of the product lines. Another 6 percent of the lines give the importer the choice between the same RVC and a change of tariff subheading (HS6).
The ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTAs provide three main points: (a) a structure that is dominated by regional value content and changes of tariff classification, often giving the importer the choice of rule; (b) a relatively large palette of instruments on paper, but (c) a limited range of instruments actually used if one takes trade values into account.
Theoretical framework

Setup
The framework is based on the Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) framework at the product level, but relaxing key symmetry assumptions on production costs and trade costs. Suppose that country i exports n i varieties to country j and let X i jk be the quantity of variety k exported from i to j (in tons); p i jk its cost, insurance, and freight price; E j the total expenditure in country j; and S i jk its share in country j's expenditure. We have
With constant elasticity of substitution preferences, p j being composite price index in j and σ elasticity of substitution among varieties, it can be shown that
Let p ik be the producer price of variety k in country i; we will assume that it is affected by an idiosyncratic shock ϕ ik representing comparative advantage; that is,
Let τ i jk be the bilateral trade cost between i and j for variety k, including all of its components (tariffs, ROOs, and other barriers). The consumer price of variety k in country j is then
Let V i j be the total value of exports from i to j. Bilateral trade between i and j is:
Country i's GDP is the sum of its sales to all destinations, including itself:
Let us define a product-specific remoteness term ik (the product-specificity comes here only from the fact that trade costs τ i jk vary across products):
and write
be a remoteness term adjusted for comparative advantage. Inverting (8) gives
Writing equation (5) in terms of P i gives
Noting finally that income equals expenditure, E j = Y j , and letting τ i j = k τ i jk 1−σ be the average trade cost from i to j across all varieties gives a modified gravity equation holding at the aggregate level in the absence of symmetry:
We are here interested in estimating this equation at the product level. Let V i jk be the value of the flow of variety k from country i to country j. Using equation (2) we have
Estimation strategy, data, and data sources
Our estimation strategy is based on the ubiquitous gravity equation, but we estimate it at a disaggregated (product) level, which requires some adjustment in the formulation of the estimation equation. That is, we allow for variation in those costs across products and estimate the gravity at the product-country pair level. Rewriting equation (13) after log-linearization, we have:
The difference between our estimation with an ordinary gravity equation is twofold: First is the presence of an exporter-product term ϕ ik correcting for comparative advantage, and second, the presence of a dyad-product term τ i jk correcting for product-specific trade costs, which are what we are interested here (product-specific tariffs and ROOs). Letting δ j and δ ik be, respectively, importer and exporter-product fixed effects, where
t i jk and r i jk being, respectively, the tariff and ROO applying to good k between countries i and j, and τ i j is the usual array of gravity controls (distance, common border, common language, etc.).
In the presence of regional trade agreements (RTAs), market access is affected by both MFN and preferential tariffs. Let be the MFN tariff rate on product k applicable to trade between i and j, and finally let x i j be a vector of country-pair attributes such as distance, common border, common language, and common colonizer. The trade-cost expression is then
Expression (18) represents an ideal formulation that we need to adapt to data constraints. First, we have ROO data only for ASEAN countries and not for other preferential agreements elsewhere in the world. Therefore we can hope to disentangle the effect of tariffs from those of ROOs only for ASEAN country pairs but not for others.
Accordingly, we mark all country pairs eligible for preferential rules with a single dummy variable defined as in (16). Because the value of preferences depends on MFN tariffs (for instance, when MFN tariffs are zero, preferences are nonexistent), we include MFN tariffs in the estimation, both linearly and interacted with the RTA dummy. Given the presence of those dummies entering linearly and interacted with MFN tariffs, our equation controls for RTAs not just in binary form but for the depth of tariff preferences given that in most FTAs intra-bloc tariffs are completely eliminated and thus set to zero (in accordance with GATT Article XXIV). Thus, the dummy in linear form is left to control for the average (across products) effect of ROOs and non-tariff measures in the given FTA. This applies to all FTAs other than ASEAN.
For RTAs other than ASEAN, the RTA dummy and interaction term together capture the average effect of trade-preference packages including both tariff-preference margins and ROOs. For ASEAN pairs, however, we also include the applicable ROO in the form of a vector of dummies, one for each type of ROO, as in equation (17). Thus, for ASEAN country pairs, the RTA dummy and its interaction with the MFN tariff capture only the effect of tariff-preference margins, whereas the ROO dummies capture specifically the effect of ROOs.
Country-product fixed effects at HS6 imply the estimation of one million coefficients. Estimating a system with about 30 million observations and over one million coefficients is beyond the computational capabilities of most computers and would tie up too much costly time on a super computer. Therefore, we simplify the estimation in several ways.
First, we replace country-product fixed effects by a vector of fixed effects by exporter, importer, and product, totaling about five thousand instead of one million. This gives the following alternative formulation:
where δ i , δ j , and δ s(k) are, respectively, exporter, importer, and sector (HS4) fixed effects, s(k) being the HS4 sector to which HS6 product k belongs. Using HS4 instead of HS6 fixed effects reduces the number of fixed effects from five thousand to one thousand, substantially reducing the estimation's computational demands.
We also carry out the estimation by section, making sure that each section includes goods with different types of ROO. We then convert estimates into ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of ROOs using a standard formula for semi-logarithmic equations, namely,
The main data source are ROO data in the form of precise requirements at the HS6 level of product classification that were provided to us by the ASEAN Secretariat. Trade data in thousand U.S. dollars are from the CEPII's BACI database, which is based on COM-TRADE but reconciles direct export and mirrored import data. Gravity variables are from the CEPII's free-access online database.
The data cover 1,241 HS-4 digit product lines or 5,180 HS-6 digit level product lines for 185 exporting countries and 108 importing countries in 2012, which are the latest available data when our analysis was conducted. HS chapters 25, 26, and 27 are excluded. This leaves all agricultural products, but excludes mining products as well as crude oil and gas products (forestry products and oil and its derivatives are still included). This results in 4,411,362 number of observations for all products and 3,959,384 for manufactured products, excluding commodities products mentioned above.
Empirical results
Baseline results are presented in Table 2 (note: in all regressions, commodities and oil products are excluded). Columns (1) and (2) present estimates for the whole sample of non-commodity trade; in column (1), ROO variables are omitted, whereas in column (2), they are included. Column (3) presents results for manufactured products only. For readability, the table is split into two parts, the first with standard gravity control variables (1) and (2) that parameter estimates are not affected by the introduction of ROO dummies, which confirms that the specification and baseline results are robust. Table 2 shows parameter estimates for the effect of ROOs, with different types consolidated into 14 main rules. Twelve out of 14 are highly significant (at the 1 percent level), and all except two are negative. Of the two positive ones, only one, on RVC or change of tariff heading, is strongly significant.
Parameter estimates are displayed graphically in Figure 2 . It illustrates that the most trade-inhibiting instruments are wholly obtained (−36.8 percent) and the textile rule (TR), even when offered a choice of with either a change of tariff classification (CTC or TR) or a regional value content (RVC or TR). This is somewhat of a puzzle, because RVCs do not appear very restrictive when used alone (−6.0 percent) whereas change of chapter, the most restrictive of CTCs, has an AVE of 18.5 percent, which is already high but much lower than when offered as a choice with the textile rule.
The apparent puzzle of the textile rule's strong effect suggests that the restrictiveness of ROOs should be assessed by section to better filter out heterogeneity of effects across sectors. Our estimation method with product fixed effects filters out the effect of product heterogeneity on trade values, but not on "treatment effects" (the effect of ROOs on trade). Section-by-section estimates allow for different effects across sectors. Across the board, ROOs appear heavily restrictive. Estimation on the whole sample, however, may capture confounding influences that artificially inflate their estimated effect on trade flows. We now turn to estimation section by section.
Results by section
We now report the results of 21 regressions run on sub-samples restricted to products within one section. Averages across all instruments are shown in Table 3 , together with weights used to calculate the trade-weighted average. Following Leamer (1974) , to avoid the endogeneity of trade flows from biasing the weights used in calculated weighted averages, we use world trade weights rather than ASEAN trade weights. Although results are, unsurprisingly, less stable at the sectoral level than at the aggregate level, a few observations come out of the analysis. First, the wholly obtained criterion appears to have a restrictive effect on preferential trade in the food, beverage, and tobacco sector, which is to be expected because it essentially prevents foreign sourcing of any sort. Section 6 (chemicals) is one of the few where the RVC seems to have a strong trade-inhibiting effect. In Section 11 (textile and apparel), unsurprisingly, the textile rule appears restrictive, whereas in Section 12 (footwear) all rules appear restrictive. In Section 16 (machinery and equipment, including electronics), the results are very unstable, which is to be expected given the presence of the World Trade Organization's information technology agreement. Finally, in the all-important Section 17 (transportation equipment), strong trade-inhibiting effects are observed for RVC, even when offered on choice with other rules (change of tariff heading or change of tariff classification other than heading but with an exception). These rules appear tailor-made to stifle automobile trade in the region to some extent.
Conclusion
This paper reviews the evidence on the effects of ASEAN's ROOs on preferential trade. Although the first-best approach to measure the effect of ROOs would be to use the trade value that uses preferred tariff rates as the dependent variable, in the absence of utilization-rate data, we based our identification strategy on the variation in trade flows across country pairs, controlling for product and country heterogeneity with product, exporter and importer fixed effects in a disaggregated (HS6) cross-section gravity framework.
Prima facie, ASEAN's ROOs have a relatively simple and transparent structure, with a large chunk of trade flows subject to a 40 percent regional value content or a change of tariff classification. In many cases, the importers can choose which rule they claim, which makes the system less penalizing. That is, ASEAN's ROOs deny preferences by an amount roughly comparable to one-fourth of the tariff-preference margins. Although moderate, this may contribute to low take-up rates that have been observed on the basis of fragmentary evidence.
Nonetheless, the econometric analysis of trade flows uncovers evidence of moderately restrictive effects, with an average tariff equivalent, across all measures and products, of 3.40 percent. This is in line with estimates in the literature. This means that ROOs inhibit ASEAN's trade by an amount roughly equivalent to one-quarter of its MFN tariffs. Put differently, ROOs seem to "nullify" one-quarter of the effect of tariff-preference margins. The trade-weighted average is substantially lower, at 2.09 percent, although the effect is heterogeneous. It is small in sectors like electronics or capital equipment, where MFN tariffs are already low so that trade is only weakly affected by preferences, and it peaks in sectors that matter for the development of ASEAN's poorest member states-sectors such as fats (6.7 percent), leather products (9 percent), textile and apparel (8.3 percent), footwear (12.7 percent), or automobiles (6.9 percent). Thus, the streamlining of ASEAN's ROOs should be viewed as part of its own development agenda.
Overall, ASEAN's relatively restrictive ROOs may not have a huge impact on trade flows as a large proportion of international trade in the Asia-Pacific area is in the electronics and capital equipment sector, where MFN tariffs are low and the attractiveness of preferences is (with or without ROOs) limited anyway. Thus, low take-up rates may simply reflect the fact that most trade is in product lines that do not stand to benefit very much from tariff reductions.
There may be gains to reap, however, from the simplification of ROOs in sectors like textile and apparel and footwear, which currently represent a low proportion of Asia-Pacific trade but may represent substantial opportunities for export-led growth and thus poverty reduction in some of the region's poorest countries. The same applies to prepared foods. Automobiles also stand out as a sector where the relaxation of ROOs might be considered, or at least carefully coordinated with plans to build up "deep" value chains within the region.
To improve the use of FTAs in the region, the simplification and streamlining of ROOs should therefore prioritize light industries like textile and apparel, footwear, and prepared foods (in particular, fats) and this should be seen as part of ASEAN's internal development and poverty-reduction strategy. Future research should be carried out to assess the specific gains that ASEAN's poorer member states would reap from less stringent ROOs.
